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Abstract 
I evaluate whether speed enforcement cameras reduce the number and severity of traffic 
accidents by penalizing drivers for exceeding speed limits. Relying on micro data on accidents 
and speed cameras across Great Britain, I find that installing these devices significantly 
enhance road safety. Putting another 1,000 cameras reduce around 1130 collisions, 330 serious 
injuries, and save 190 lives annually, generating net benefits of around £21 million. However, 
these effects are highly localised around the camera and dissipate over distance, and there is 
suggestive evidence of more collisions away from the camera, illustrating the possible 
limitations associated with fixed speed cameras. 
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a serious health issue that has disproportionately aﬀected the younger generation, causing
many life years lost. For instance, in United Kingdom (UK), motor crashes are the leading
cause of deaths for those between 5 and 34 years old and account for more than 15% of the
deaths in this age group. Overall, 186,189 individuals are involved in collisions, out of which
162,315 suﬀer from slight injuries, 22,144 are seriously harm and 1,730 eventually died (DfT,
2016) in 2015 across UK. It is 3 and 8 times more likely to die from traﬃc accidents relative
to homicides and HIV/AIDs. Translating the cost of accidents to dollar value, collisions cost
UK a total of ¿10.3 billion just in 20151.
Many reasons explain why crashes occur and why it can be fatal. The loss of control of
the vehicle could be due to carelessness, distraction, intoxication and speeding. According to
Department for Transport (DfT), speeding accounts for more than 60% of the fatal accidents
in UK in 2015 (e.g exceeding speed limit, travelling too fast for conditions, loss control of
vehicle, swerved vehicle). Similarly, other than the size and the built of auto-mobile, the use
of seat belts, terrain, weather and road conditions, the severity of the crashes is dependent
on the velocity of the colliding vehicle. While speeding might be considered a menial oﬀence
to many, it is evident that it is immense in determining both the probability and gravity of
crashes.
Diﬀerent laws and regulations have been introduced to prevent traﬃc accidents. Since
the seminal paper by Peltzman (1975), evaluating these interventions have drawn consider-
able interest from economists. These include texting bans (Abouk & Adams, 2013), speed
limits (Ashenfelter & Greenstone, 2004; van Benthem, 2015), traﬃc police (DeAngelo &
Hansen, 2014), drinking (Dee, 1999; Hansen, 2015) and seat belt laws (Cohen & Einav,
2003). Falling back to the economic models of crime (Becker, 1968), these instruments deter
reckless driving through punishment. Another widely used strategy is speed camera that
penalizes driver for exceeding speed limits. They are often deployed at stretches of road
particularly prone to collisions (e.g windy, hilly roads, near schools and petrol stations).
There are several reasons why it is important to evaluate the eﬃcacy of speed cameras.
First, it is a controversial instrument. There are concerns whether it improves road safety
or it is simply an instrument to rake up revenues. Just in 2015, a total of 166,216 ﬁnes
were issued in England and Wales that amount to more than ¿31 million2. It is argued
that alternative strategies, such as vehicle-activated speed limit sign, could be equivalently
1These ﬁgures are much larger ﬁgures in United States. A federal study conducted by National
Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration reveals that estimated economic cost from motor crashes is
approximately US$242 billion in 2010 (Administration et al., 2014).
2Read more at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38724301
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1 Introduction
Across the world, an estimated 50 million individuals are hurt from traﬃc collisions, with
1.2 million succumbing to these injuries every year (Peden et al., 2004). Traﬃc accident is
eﬀective in improving road safety3 but at a fraction of the cost. Interests groups have
since put up multiple petitions to remove these cameras4. Second, there are immediate
policy implications as many of the older devices are wet-ﬁlm cameras that require upgrading
to digital technology. However, upgrades have been held back due to cuts to the Road
Safety Grants by the Coalition Government. In fact, several local partnerships, including
Oxfordshire, West Midlands, Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire, Swindon and Northamptonshire,
are forced to switch oﬀ their cameras. If ﬁxed speed cameras are eﬃcacious in improving
road safety, then these devices should be upgraded and switched back on. Finally, questions
are also raised whether these devices induce more collisions due to "kangaroo" eﬀects (Elvik,
1997). That is when drivers abruptly slow down in proximity to the camera or immediately
speed up beyond surveillance, causing more accidents further away from the camera. Thus,
the objective of this paper is to address these questions through rigorous empirical analyses.
In this paper, I estimate the eﬀects of ﬁxed speed cameras on reducing occurrence and
severity of collisions. To do so, I put together a rich dataset of more than 2,500 ﬁxed
speed cameras across England, Scotland and Wales (Great Britain). To measure accident
outcomes, I rely STATS19 Road Accident Dataset that documents every reported collision
from 1979 onwards. This allow me to conduct the analysis at a ﬁne spatial scale and to
capture enforcement eﬀects moving away from the camera. In short, I compare accident
outcomes before and after the camera is introduced with comparable sites using a quasi-
experimental diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework.
For the estimates to be valid, it requires the mean diﬀerences in unobserved charac-
teristics between sites not to be correlated with the installation of enforcement cameras.
This assumption, however, is likely to be violated given the endogenous process of choos-
ing sites. Cameras are often found at areas prone to collisions and this selection process is
likely to accentuate the diﬀerences between sites with and without cameras. I adopt several
strategies to mitigate endogeneity. First, I restrict the analysis to only sites that will ever
have enforcement cameras and rely on time variation of installation for identiﬁcation. That
is, sites with cameras install in future (but no cameras now) will be employed as reference
groups for sites having installation now. Second, I constraint reference groups to sites that
received installations less than six years apart from those sites treated now. The notion is
that sites treated further apart could be more dissimilar. This could be the case if the `worst'
sites receive cameras ﬁrst. Next, I include a vector of time-variant city level characteristics
3See https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080422/
debtext/80422-0003.htm for more information
4Read http://www.safespeed.org.uk/ for more information
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to control for region-speciﬁc shocks that could correlate with camera installations. Finally,
to further attenuate observable diﬀerences, I pair each camera site with their most similar
later-treated counterfactual with a stringent exact matching requirements based on camera
and road characteristics .
I contribute to the existing literature in several ways. Earlier papers, largely restricted
to the transportation literature (See Table 7 in Data Appendix for details), have either no or
loosely constructed control groups and this could severely bias the estimates. I circumvent
this issue by carefully selecting untreated sites to control for trends in accident outcomes
in the absence of camera installations. Second, in contrast to previous papers, which are
usually city-speciﬁc analyses restricted to a small sample of cameras, I exploit a represen-
tative national dataset to increase the external validity of the research. Third, with ﬁne
spatial temporal information on accidents and speed cameras, I can accurately capture how
enforcement eﬀects vary across space, allowing us understand whether cameras exacerbate
collisions away from the site. Finally, utilizing estimates from my analysis, I compute the
welfare eﬀects associated with speed cameras to provide rigorous assessment whether these
devices should be deployed.
The headline ﬁnding is that speed cameras unambiguously reduce both the counts and
severity of collisions. After installing a camera, the number of accidents and minor injuries
fell by 17%-39% and 17%-38%, which amounts to 0.89-2.36 and 1.19-2.87 per kilometre. As
for seriousness of the crashes, the number of fatalities and serious injuries decrease by 0.08-
0.19 and 0.25-0.58 per kilometre compared to pre-installation levels, which represents a drop
of 58%-68% and 28%-55% respectively. Putting these estimates into perspective, installing
another 1,000 speed cameras reduce around 1130 collisions5, mitigate 330 serious injuries,
and save 190 lives annually6, generating beneﬁts of around ¿21 million7. These ﬁndings are
robust across a range of speciﬁcations that relaxes identiﬁcation assumptions
5These estimates are taken from the preferred speciﬁcation in Column (7) of Table 2.
6The ratio of lives save in my study is much higher than the average national accidents death ratio
over the last 10 years from 1995 to 2015 (1.02%). There are several explanations to this. First, speed
cameras are often found along roads with a much larger proportion of death related accidents. The
pre-treatment percentage of deaths from collisions around speed camera sites is 2.50% (see Table
1) more than twice the national ratio. Second, by reducing speed through deterrence, cameras
could have disproportionately mitigated more severe accidents. Another explanation is that speed
cameras are less eﬀective in preventing collisions compared to deaths. Possible kangaroo eﬀects, such
as sudden braking in front of camera, or speeding up beyond surveillance, could have attributed to
more collisions.
7This is obtained from multiplying the net beneﬁts from welfare analysis in Table 5 by 1,000.
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I further allow enforcement eﬀects to vary across diﬀerent speed limits, road types, and
across distance. My results show that it is more eﬀective to install cameras along roads at
higher speed limits as much larger reductions in collision outcomes are observed. This could
be because these roads are more dangerous in the ﬁrst place as drivers commute at higher
speeds. In addition, enforcement eﬀects appear highly localised around 500 metres from
the camera and dissipate moving away. Beyond 1.5 kilometres from the camera, there are
suggestive evidence of a rebound in collisions, injuries and deaths, indicating drivers could
have speed up beyond camera surveillance and cause more accidents. These results, which
illustrate the limitations associated with ﬁxed speed cameras, suggest that newer prototypes,
such as mobile or variable speed cameras, should be considered.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background
to speed enforcement cameras in UK. Section 3 describes the identiﬁcation strategy adopted
in this paper. Section 4 outlines the data used in this paper and Section 5 discusses the
ﬁndings in this paper. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Background
Diﬀerent enforcement cameras, including ﬁxed, mobile and variable speed, are employed
across UK. Fixed speed camera, which is the earliest generation of speed detecting devices,
could be found as early as 1992 in London. Mobile and Variable speed camera are newer
prototypes that only grew in prominence in the last decade. Mobile speed cameras are
ﬁxated on auto-mobiles with the ﬂexibility to be deployed in diﬀerent locations but require
manpower to operate. Variable speed cameras enforce speed limit over a stretch by measuring
average speed between two points on the road, having the advantage of reducing speed over
a longer span. For an illustration refer to Figure 1. The focus of this paper is on ﬁxed speed
cameras as I can reliably determine the location and operating dates. The minimum penalty
for speeding is ¿100 and 3 demerit points but this depends on how much the speed limit is
exceeded.
Cameras are typically enforced by safety camera partnership, which is a joint collabo-
ration of police force, local government, highway agency and health authorities. They work
hand-in-hand to identify dangerous sites for enforcement. Sites that are chosen for ﬁxed
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(a) Fixed Speed (b) Average Speed
(c) Mobile Speed
Figure 1: Diﬀerent types of Speed Cameras used in United Kingdom
speed camera installation must comply with the following national selection rules (DfT,
2004)8:
1. Site length must be at a length of between 0.4 and 1.5 kilometres;
2. At least 4 killed and serious collisions (KSI) & 8 personal injury collisions (PIC) per
kilometre in the 3 years before installation9;
3. Suitable for the loading and unloading of cameras
4. At least 85% of the traﬃc is travelling is at or above the Association of Chief Police
Oﬃcers (ACPO) threshold based on speed surveys;
5. At least 20% of the drivers are exceeding speed limits;
6. No other more cost eﬀective solutions to improve road safety as determined by the road
engineers.
8One other strategy is to utilize a regression discontinuity design over these rules and to obtain
some local estimates around these thresholds. This is not adopted due to the following reasons.
First, I do not have information on average speed, site length, suitability that aﬀect whether a site
receives camera enforcement. Furthermore, these rules are not deterministic for installation. It is
possible for sites to have installations without meeting these rules, impeding identiﬁcation of eﬀects
around these thresholds.
9One crash can result in multiple causalities. Adding up the number of slight injury collisions
and KSI will provide the PIC count.
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The ﬁrst two guidelines are considered more important for enforcement. While not stated
explicitly, I do ﬁnd that many of these cameras are often found near schools, bus stops and
petrol stations to ensure pedestrians safety. Even when not all the above requirements are
met, enforcement could take place if a large number of non-fatal collisions due to speeding
are recorded. These sites are classiﬁed as exceptional sites. This ambiguity impedes the use
of observable characteristics to identify comparable reference groups. The local partnership
also decides whether to install mobile, average or ﬁxed speed cameras. Fixed speed cameras
are usually deployed when many accidents cluster around the site. To commission new sites
for camera installation, partnerships are require to provide full details on these proposed sites
for the forthcoming year, subjected to approval by the national board. They are allowed
to recover penalty receipts to cover the cost of camera installations and enforcement. Since
2006, there are slight amendments to the guidelines. In particular, the KSI requirements fall
from 4 to 3. A risk value is computed for each site of which every KSI and PIC collisions
are given 5 points and 1 point respectively. To qualify for camera installation, a site must at
least have 22 points if the speed limit is 40mph or less and 18 points for speed limits beyond
50mph. For more details, refer to DfT (2005).
Once installed, several clear signages must be placed less than 1 kilometre away from
the camera. This is to warn drivers about the presence of camera and to inform them about
the speed limit. Since 2002, all the cameras are painted in bold yellow and must at least
be visible from 60 metres if the speed limit is less than 40 mph and at 100 metres if speed
limits are higher. This is to improve visibility to ensure that drivers do not abruptly reduce
speed in and around the camera, leading to more crashes. These cameras are unattended
but it is more expensive to maintain wet-ﬂim older camera as it requires ﬂim replacement.
Newer cameras uses wireless digital technology to transmit oﬀending data.
Most of the cameras across UK are Gatsometer BV Cameras that are single direction
and rear facing. This means the camera will only take images of the back of a speeding
vehicle so as not to blind the oﬀender and impede driving performance. However, some
of the newer cameras could be bi-directional10 or front facing11. Majority of the cameras
operate though radar technology although there are some that rely on strips on the roads
for speed detection (e.g Truvelo D-Cam, SpeedCurb). If there is a dispute to the ﬁne, the
10Cameras installed in the central of the road could be turned periodically to target motorists at
either side of the road. Sometimes, multiple housings could be installed on both sides of the road.
Newer devices such as the Truvelo D-Cam can take pictures at both directions.
11The second most popular type is Truvelo Cameras that takes an image of the speeding oﬀender
from the front using non visible infra-red ﬂashes. The advantage is that there are no disputes
towards who is driving the vehicle.
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white lines on the roads near the housing will provide a secondary instrument to determine
12 whether drivers exceed speed limits. For an illustration of how speed cameras operate,
refer to Figure 2. Figure 9 in Data Appendix illustrates the diﬀerent prototypes across UK.
Figure 2: Illustration of how ﬁxed speed cameras operate
3 Literature Review
Previous literature, largely from transport engineering , show that speed cameras reduce
travel speed, accidents, injuries and fatalities near the camera (Gains et al., 2004, 2005; Chen
et al., 2002; Shin et al., 2009). These estimates, however, vary substantially across diﬀerent
studies. A survey of existing literature reveals that after enforcement cameras are installed,
average speeds fell by between 1.7 and 4.4 miles per hour and crash reductions vary between
11% and 51%. For a review of the existing literature, refer to Wilson et al. (2010).
Existing empirical work, however, suﬀers from substantial limitations that questions the
validity of the estimates. For one, researches are often limited to a small number of speed
cameras constrained in a particular area (Chen et al., 2002; Goldenbeld & van Schagen, 2005;
Jones et al., 2008; Shin et al., 2009). This raise concerns on the external validity of these
ﬁndings. This paper overcomes this limitation by analysing a more representative sample of
cameras of up to 2,500 ﬁxed speed cameras installed across England, Scotland and Wales.
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, many studies are restricted to before-and-after
analysis with either no or loosely constructed control groups to account for trends in accidents
12The distance between each of the white lines represent 5mph. Several images of moving vehicle
over time will illustrate whether driver is speeding.
8
(Christie et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2008). Without controlling for the general downward
trends of accidents due to technological advancements over time, such as better brake system,
more robust car frame and improved road built, it is likely that the documented enforcement
eﬀects are biased. For studies with control groups, they do not account for the fact that
camera location choices are endogenous. As mentioned before, selected sites are peculiar
accident "black" spots with many drivers exceeding speed limits. Hence, sites with no camera
installation are unlikely to be comparable. These diﬀerences, if unobserved or imprecisely
measured, will enter the speciﬁcation and bias the estimates. Without due consideration,
studies also rely either on nearby roads (Newstead & Cameron, 2003; Perez et al., 2007;
Shin et al., 2009) or identify reference groups based on road and traﬃc characteristics (Keall
et al., 2001; Cunningham et al., 2008).
To create more comparable reference groups, some studies select sites based on data-
generating methods like empirical bayes to identify reference groups with similar trends in
accidents and traﬃc ﬂow (Elvik, 1997; Chen et al., 2002; Gains et al., 2004, 2005). However,
it is often not justiﬁed how reference groups are identiﬁed. To clarify on the matching
process, Li et al. (2013) uses propensity score matching to determine reference groups based
on observable co-variates (e.g traﬃc ﬂow, pre-treatment accident rates) that are used for
site selections. Still, it is improbable these strategies address the concerns as sites can have
cameras even without meeting all the requirements. Moreover, it is possible that these sites
are not treated because the surge in accidents are considered transient and it is likely to
revert to mean levels even without intervention, underestimating enforcement eﬀects. In
this paper, I adopt the intuitive strategy of using only sites with cameras. That is, sites with
cameras in future will be employed as reference groups for sites with installation now. In
the subsequent sections, I will illustrate how the identiﬁcation assumptions for this strategy
are not violated.
Another point neglected by the literature is how the eﬀectiveness of enforcement cameras
vary over distance as the focus is usually around the camera. This is an important point as
cameras could attribute to "kangaroo" eﬀects (Elvik, 1997) - when drivers abruptly slow down
their vehicle near the camera to avoid oﬀending or speed up once beyond camera surveillance,
inducing more collisions. Several studies, including Newstead & Cameron (2003); Mountain
et al. (2004); Jones et al. (2008), try to break down the impacts across distance but the
lack of ﬁne spatial information meant that bandwidths are too big and results are thus
uninformative. Relying on ﬁne spatial information on accidents and speed cameras, I can
delineate enforcement eﬀects every 100 metres (up to 2 kilometres) to understand whether
cameras cause kangaroo eﬀects.
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Finally, there is also a lack of analysis on how these enforcement cameras fare over time
and over diﬀerent speed limits. One of the few papers that addresses this is Christie et al.
(2003) that look at how eﬀects vary over time and speed limits. Their study, however, is
constrained to an unrepresentative sample over a short period. Utilising detailed information
on speed camera characteristics, and over a longer timespan, I inform how cameras perform
over time and across roads with diﬀerent speed limits. For a succinct summary of previous
literature, refer to Table 7 in Data Appendix.
4 Data
To examine the eﬀect of speed cameras on accidents, I put together a few data sources.
First, I rely on STATS 19 Road Accident Database that provides detailed information for
each reported accident to the Police in England, Wales and Scotland 13. A wide set of
details including location, time, date, road conditions, vehicle type, number of injuries,
serious injuries and fatalities (pedestrians and inside the vehicle) are recorded. Shapeﬁles
that provide detailed information of the road network and that delineate the boundaries for
local authority districts14 across United Kingdom are provided by Ordinance Survey.
Details of the speed cameras are hand-collected from websites of various local authorities
provided by Department for Transport (DfT) 15. For most of the local authorities, information
on the location of camera housing, year of installation, speed limits and camera type are
provided. For areas that did not provide these information, I request access using Freedom
of Information Act (FOI). I classify whether these cameras are at rural or urban areas
according to Rural-Urban classiﬁcation shapeﬁles provided by Oﬃce of National Statistics
(ONS).
Combining the various sources of information using Geographic Information System
(GIS), I am able to match the location of speed cameras and accidents to the road network.
To visualize, refer to Figure 3 and imagine the line as a particular stretch of road with a
13It is possible that there could be under-reporting of non fatal accidents to the police. This should
not be an issue for more serious crashes that are usually reported to the Police. As long as the
under-reporting of accidents is random across time and is not correlated with camera installation,
it should not bias my estimates
14Local authorities are responsible of conferring government services within a district. In total,
there are 353 diﬀerent districts in England, 32 in Scotland and 22 in Wales.
15For more information on the list of https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
speed-camera-information
10
camera installed. With the exact location of each accident, I could sum accident outcomes
along the road that the speed camera i is installed annually between k and k − 100 metres
interval. For example, within 100 metres from the camera, all accidents that take place in
area "A" in a particular year are accounted for. For my baseline estimates, which examine
the eﬀects 500 metres left and right of the housing, I will aggregate all the accidents that
took place in "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E".
Figure 3: Illustration on how accident outcomes are computed across space
To capture the year-on-year variation in local authority characteristics, I rely on several
sources. Information on the Annual Average Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) is collected
from DfT. Details on the average earnings and number of hours worked are complied from
Annual Labour Force Survey. Data on population proﬁle are collected from Nomis Popula-
tion Estimates. For details on how the variables are constructed, refer to Table 6 in Data
Appendix.
5 Identiﬁcation Strategy and Methodology
The research design adopted in this paper is a ﬁxed eﬀect, quasi-experimental diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence approach estimated using count regressions models. This is because collision
outcomes follow an implicit count process that only takes non-negative integer values. Using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approaches, which speciﬁes a conditional mean function that
takes negative values, one could possibly yield inconsistent estimates (Cameron & Trivedi,
2013). Therefore, I implement two count models: Poisson and Negative Binomial. The
latter was adopted because it relaxes the assumption that the conditional mean is equal to
the conditional variance, allowing for over-dispersion in the data. This strong assumption
for Poisson models are often violated. To correct for over-dispersion in Poisson regressions,
following DeAngelo & Hansen (2014), I report sandwich (robust) standard errors.
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Speciﬁcally, to examine the impact of speed cameras on traﬃc accidents, the following
baseline speciﬁcation is adopted:
E(Yijt) = exp(αi + γTit +X
′
jtφ+ θt + εijt), (1)
where Yijt is the counts of Y (Accidents, Slight Injuries, Serious Injuries, Deaths
16)
within 0 & 500 metres from camera/site i in local authority j installed in year t.
The key variable of interest is Tit, which is a binary variable that equals to unity af-
ter the speed camera is installed. If enforcement cameras are able to deter speeding along
treacherous sites and improve road safety, I expect γ to be < 0. αi represents the time invari-
ant unobserved characteristics that inﬂuence whether a camera is installed. For instance,
sites that are more precarious (e.g on a steep slope, windy roads) or are bypassing areas
more susceptible to accidents (e.g schools, petrol stations) are more probable to be under
enforcement. To partial out these eﬀects, I exploit the variation of outcome Y over time
with camera/site (i) ﬁxed eﬀects.
I further include a vector of time variant city-level controls at local authority j at year
t (X ′jt). These variables include vehicle miles travelled, population size, percentage of pop-
ulation between 18 to 25 years old, gross annual pay and hours worked. This is to allay
concern that there are regional shocks that could be correlated with installation of cameras
and inﬂuence Y . For instance, if these devices are installed in areas that experience a spike
in the proportion of teen drivers that could endanger road safety, γ could be underestimated.
θt represents year ﬁxed eﬀects to partial any general time trends in Y across the regions.
Technological advancements on car safety (better car frames, tires, air bags) and roads qual-
ity can reducing both the occurrences and severity of collisions over time. For more details
on the description of the variables used in this paper, refer to Table 6 in Data Appendix.
εijt is the error term. Endogeneity arises when E[εijt|Tit 6= 0]. This is likely to occur
given the selection bias from camera installation. Roads with enforcement cameras are
peculiar accident-prone roads with many drivers exceeding speed limits. Those without
cameras are likely to very diﬀerent from those with and such unobserved diﬀerences are
16According to the deﬁnition provided by the Department for Transport, slight injury is deﬁned as
an injury of minor character that do not require any medical attention. Serious injury is when the
injury causes the person to be detained in the hospital for medical treatment and that the injury
causes death more than 30 days after the collision. Deaths is deﬁned as a human casualty who
sustained injuries from the accident are die less than 30 days from the collision.
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likely to enter into estimation via εijt. Previous literature addresses this challenge by creating
reference groups through trends in traﬃc ﬂow and accidents using empirical bayes method
(Elvik, 1997; Mountain et al., 2005) or matching on observable characteristics Li et al. (2013).
There are two main issues with using these sites. First, even with the stated parameters,
it is problematic given that installations could occur even though some of the criterion are
not met. In addition, eligible sites without cameras could be deemed by authorities as spots
experiencing transient episodes of more collisions. Accident rates are likely to dip even in the
absence of cameras and this could attribute to a downward bias to the enforcement eﬀects.
Hence, the strategy adopted in this paper is to restrict the sample to only sites with
cameras and exploit the variation in the timing of installation. This is possible as I can
accurately determine the installation dates of ﬁxed speed cameras. Identiﬁcation stems
from comparing changes in accident outcomes with changes on roads that will have cameras
installed in the near future. The assumption is that sites that have enforcement cameras
in the future are quite similar for sites that have cameras installations now. This could,
however, be violated if "worse" sites are treated ﬁrst. Thus, I restrict future reference sites
(control group) to recently installed ones by removing any observations more than 3 years
before and after the year the enforcement cameras are installed.
To visualize, refer to ﬁgure 4 that illustrates the timeline for a sample of four cameras
(A,B,C & D). Unshaded areas denote the window 3 years before and after the cameras are
installed with T = 0 representing pre-treatment and T = 1 representing post-treatment.
Shaded areas denote observations outside the +3,-3 window that are not included in the
analysis. In this example, CAM B and D are counterfactuals for CAM C. CAM B provides
the baseline from 1998 to 1999 and CAM D from 2000 to 2001 after CAM C is installed.
Conversely, CAM A is not a reference group for CAM C because the treatment dates are
too far apart. This also means that only a future "recently" treated camera will enter as
reference group.
While many papers focus on accident outcomes near the housing, they fail to capture how
enforcement eﬀects could change moving away. The concern is whether "kangaroo" eﬀects
could exacerbate collisions away from the housing. To precisely capture how the eﬀects
change with distance from the camera housing, the following speciﬁcation is estimated:
E(Y k−100,kijt ) = exp(α
k−100,k
i + γT
k−100,k
it +X
′k−100,k
jt φ+ θ
k−100,k
t + εijt) (2)
where k represents the various distance bandwidths (eg. 0 to 100m, 100m to 200m... 1900m
to 2000m) up to 2 kilometres left and right of the camera. In brevity, I am estimating
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Figure 4: Illustration of Time lines for diﬀerent cameras in sample. Bold lines represent
the treatment year for each camera and unshaded window denotes 3 years before and after
the camera is installed. Shaded areas denotes observations more than three years before
or after installation and are omitted from the analysis. T=1: Treatment Period; T=0:
Pre-Treatment
the enforcement eﬀects for every 100m bandwidth to identify how enforcement eﬀects vary
moving away from the camera. I achieve this by running stratiﬁed regressions for every k
and k− 100 bandwidth for k ∈ 0, 100, ...1900, 2000 metres. If the eﬀects are highly localised,
I expect γ to be more negative as k is smaller. If there are displacement of accidents, I would
expect γk to be positive outside camera surveillance. Otherwise, the rest of the speciﬁcation
is similar to equation 1.
6 Empirical Results
In this section, I estimate the eﬀects of speed enforcement cameras on various accident
outcomes. First, I provide some summary statistics for the sample of speed cameras in the
analysis. Next, I present baseline estimates on the eﬀect of speed cameras within 500 metres
from the housing. I then put these estimates through various robustness and placebo tests
that relax identiﬁcation assumptions. Subsequently, I allow camera enforcement eﬀects vary
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across diﬀerent speed limits, road type, over time and distance. Finally, I compute welfare
estimates associated with these devices.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5 and 6 shows the temporal and spatial distribution of ﬁxed speed cameras from
1992 to 2016. In 1992, 24 cameras are installed in London in a pilot program before spreading
to other larger cities. By 2000, there are more than 1,000 cameras distributed across more
than half of the local authorities across Great Britain. Fixed speed cameras remain the
predominant instrument to deter speeding with another 1,368 devices deployed in the next
8 years. Most of the local authorities have at least 1 speed camera installed by 2008 but it is
less prominent after due to the increasing reliance on newer prototypes, such as variable and
mobile speed cameras, due to larger coverage areas or ﬂexibility in relocation. As of 2016,
there are approximately 3,500 ﬁxed speed cameras across England, Scotland and Wales. My
dataset, which encompasses a total of 2,548 cameras, covers more than 70% of total number
of ﬁxed-speed cameras installed. The rest of the 30% are missing either because (1) the local
camera partnerships did not respond to our data requests17 or (2) the information provided
do not allow me to accurately determine the location of cameras.
Next, I present some basic summary statistics for pre-treatment accident outcomes,
camera, road and local authority characteristics in Table 1. Pre-treatment accident outcomes
are computed by averaging the number of collisions within 2 kilometres from the housing ﬁve
years before the camera is installed. For instance, if a camera is installed in 2000, I will take
the mean of annual crashes from 1995 to 1999. There are approximately 0.41 accidents every
100 metres annually, resulting in 0.40 slight injuries, 0.08 serious injuries and 0.01 deaths.
On average, the limit enforced by speed cameras is around 37mph although bulk of the
cameras impose a 30mph limit (more than 70%). Most of the cameras (75%) are installed
in A Roads - primary routes that are slightly smaller than motorways (or expressways).
The rest are mostly installed in B (11%) and Minor Roads (14%), with less than 2% ﬁxed
along Motorways and C roads. There are not many ﬁxed cameras on Motorways because
variable speed cameras are usually deployed instead to enforce speed limit over a longer
distance. Also, approximately 80% of the cameras located along busier roads in populated
urban areas.
17This include Warwickshire, Suﬀolk, Norfolk, Wiltshire and Swindon.
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Figure 5: Number of Speed Cameras and Local Authorities with speed cameras from 1992
to 2016 across England, Scotland and Wales
As mentioned, one of the identiﬁcation challenges is that earlier camera sites are diﬀerent
from those receiving installation later. To examine if this is the case, I split the sample into 5
groups (1992 to 1995, 1996 to 2000, 2001 to 2005, 2005 to 2010 and 2010 onwards) according
to the year the cameras are installed. I do not ﬁnd sites that have cameras ﬁrst more
dangerous than the latter ones. No evident diﬀerences are also observed in camera/road
characteristics, local authority demographics and labour outcomes. If anything, there seems
to be more crashes and injuries for cameras that are installed after 2006. These cameras
are often found on roads with higher speed limit. One possible explanation is the change
in the guidelines for selecting camera sites. As a precaution, I remove these cameras in my
robustness tests but this did not materially aﬀect the results.
6.2 Eﬀects of Speed Cameras on Accidents
6.2.1 Baseline Estimates
Table 2 presents a set of baseline estimates from equation (1) that captures the eﬀect of
speed enforcement cameras 500 metres left and right of the camera housing on various acci-
dent outcomes, including number of Accidents, Slight Injuries, Serious Injuries and Deaths.
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(a) 24 sites (b) +1044 sites
(c) +1368 sites (d) +109 sites
Figure 6: Development of Fixed Speed Cameras across England, Scotland and Wales from
1992 to 2016.
Due to space constraints, I only report results from Poisson regressions. Findings from Neg-
ative Binomial regressions in Table 8 in Data Appendix and are fairly similar. Only the
coeﬃcients (γ) for key estimate Tit are reported. To interpret these coeﬃcients, I compute
the semi-elasticity (%∆) by taking the exponential of γ before subtracting by 1. The abso-
lute reductions in collision outcomes (Absolute) are by computed by multiplying %∆ with
the pre-treatment mean. Only ever-treated sites are included in the speciﬁcation and late
treated sites act as reference sites for earlier ones. In short, I am comparing changes in
collision outcomes for sites after camera is installed with sites that has camera installations
in the future. The sample is smaller for Serious Injuries and Deaths. This is because there
are several sites that experience no fatalities or severe injuries over the sample period and
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Table 1: Summary statistics of camera sites across time
All 1992 - 1995 1996 - 2000 2001 - 2005 2006 - 2010 2011 - 2016
Pre-treatment Accident Outcomes
Accident Counts/100m 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.54 0.60
(0.37) (0.31) (0.39) (0.31) (0.56) (0.38)
Slight Injuries/100m 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.56 0.71
(0.42) (0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.58) (0.43)
Traﬃc Deaths/100m 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Serious Injuries/100m 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Camera/Road Characteristics
Speed Limit 37.20 36.53 32.75 34.16 41.05 34.79
(10.92) (10.73) (6.72) (9.39) (12.35) (9.33)
A Road 0.75 0.76 0.69 0.79 0.77 0.73
(0.43) (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.42) (0.44)
B Road 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.12
(0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.27) (0.33) (0.32)
C Road 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.06) (0.00) (0.12)
Motorway 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.19) (0.09)
Minor Road 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.13
(0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.33) (0.26) (0.33)
Rural 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.15
(0.38) (0.41) (0.32) (0.28) (0.35) (0.36)
LA Characteristics
Gross Annual Salary 25612.47 24170.51 23423.40 26221.43 23488.91 24245.93
(4317.99) (3650.61) (4193.10) (4143.65) (2774.21) (4143.14)
Hours worked 37.84 37.92 37.87 37.66 37.83 37.86
(0.74) (0.62) (0.71) (0.56) (0.53) (0.67)
Job Count 118697.66 112070.20 112079.69 143444.02 109272.51 116533.02
(92509.82) (84887.33) (93917.90) (120102.28) (90747.35) (95111.37)
Job Density 0.85 0.76 1.01 0.81 0.65 0.88
(0.41) (0.23) (3.91) (0.42) (0.16) (2.61)
% Pop 18 to 25 9.29 9.11 9.56 9.42 9.73 9.38
(2.44) (2.35) (2.92) (2.00) (1.82) (2.59)
Population Size 204907.15 221811.27 208318.24 262401.66 254666.19 219312.20
(104695.46) (135361.03) (142054.29) (177959.39) (178190.47) (142834.82)
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.33 6.63 6.95 7.25 8.40 6.84
(1.94) (1.95) (1.81) (1.99) (2.89) (1.95)
VMT 2425.91 2633.17 3271.23 2053.54 1619.41 2797.63
(2370.39) (2566.26) (2878.41) (2368.73) (1410.15) (2685.05)
Observations 2548 314 754 1123 301 57
Standard errors reported in parenthesis.
these sites are removed from the analysis.
Moving from left to right, additional covariates are included in the estimation. In the
ﬁrst column, I estimate the eﬀects associated with the entire sample of speed cameras from
1992 to 2016. I restrict to a sub-sample of sites that I have a full set of control variables
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in the second column. This sample is signiﬁcantly smaller. In both speciﬁcations, I include
site and year ﬁxed eﬀects but did not add any control variables. I observe that enforcement
cameras not only reduce the number of crashes, but also abate the severity of collisions. It is
also comforting to observe that results are very consistent across the two columns, suggesting
that the reduced sample is fairly representative.
Next, I include a vector of time-variant local authority (LA) characteristics to partial
out regional speciﬁc shocks that could correlate with the camera installations and aﬀect
outcomes. This include demographic (population size and % of population between 18 to
25) and labour characteristics (gross annual salary and working hours). Controlling for
these diﬀerences has an inconsequential eﬀect on the estimates. Subsequently, I control
for the annual average vehicle miles travelled (VMT) as more driving could induce more
accidents. Estimates remain fairly stable. I further include a number of weather controls
including temperature and wind speed. The concern is whether bad weather shocks, which
could induce more accidents, are correlated with camera installations. This signiﬁcantly
reduce the sample by more than two-third due to missing data but again did not change the
estimates much.
In column (6), I include a sample of non-camera sites18 despite meeting the selection
criterion (for more information refer to section 2). The rationale is to understand the bias
from incorporating non-treated sites based on some matching-on-observables strategy fre-
quently adopted in the previous literature. I ﬁnd that estimated enforcement eﬀects are
much smaller. This could be driven by the fact the untreated sites experience a fall in colli-
sion outcomes even without camera installation because these surge in accidents are deemed
to be transient and collision outcomes are expected to revert to mean levels. This explains
why local authorities chose not to install cameras around these sites. The result illustrates
the problem of using these sites to measure enforcement eﬀects as it might underestimate
the enforcement eﬀects of cameras. Furthermore, as mentioned, sites that receive installa-
tions later could be diﬀerent from those earlier treated sites. Thus, in column (7), I restrict
the reference groups to just recently treated cameras by excluding any observations more
than 3 years before and after the camera is installed. To illustrate, this is equivalent of
removing the shaded areas in Figure 4 from estimation. Like before, estimates remain fairly
18To create a sample of non-camera sites, I ﬁrst place random points along major roads (A & B
roads) that are at least 2,000 metres from one another and 2,000 metres from the nearest speed
camera. Following that I calculate the yearly collision, injuries and death counts within 500 metres
from these random points. I only retain sites with more than 4 killed and serious injuries (KSI)
and 8 personal injury collisions in a 3 year rolling window. In total, I ﬁnd 694 sites that meet the
selection criterion but are not treated.
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similar compared to before, suggesting that sites that receive installations ﬁrst are not that
dissimilar from later treated sites.
Overall, I document that speed cameras not only attributed to signiﬁcant reductions in
the number of collisions, but also abated the severity of the crashes as well. Results are
fairly steady and the addition of controls do not appear to matter much. Across the board, I
observe substantial decreases for diﬀerent accident outcomes that are signiﬁcant at 1% level.
After an enforcement camera is installed, I observe collisions fell by 17% to 39%, representing
an absolute reduction of 0.89 to 2.36 per kilometre per annum. Slight injuries fell by between
1.19 and 2.87 per kilometre per annum, which amounts to a 17% to 38% decrease. There
are between 0.25 and 0.58 less serious injuries surrounding the camera, equivalent to a 28%
to 55% fall from pre-treatment levels. Largest reductions in relative levels are documented
for deaths. On average, there are approximately 0.08 to 0.19 less fatalities per kilometre,
which represents a massive 58% to 68% decline19.
6.2.2 Robustness & Placebo Tests
Table 3 summarizes a battery of robustness tests that further relaxes identiﬁcation as-
sumptions to ensure that earlier estimates are not spurious. Like before, I estimate each test
using both Poisson and Negative Binomial models and results did not diﬀer much.
First, I limit my analysis to a sub-sample of Motorways and A-Roads. The notion is that
traﬃc20 is less likely to be displaced along these major roads after speed camera is introduced
because there are less alternative routes available. Results in Columns (1) and (2) reveal
that this did not matter much as enforcement eﬀects are fairly similar compared to before.
Next, in column (3) and (4), I remove sites that were installed from 2006 onwards because the
change in the site selection criterion could induce these sites to be less comparable. Removing
these later treated sites appear to reduce my estimates marginally but inconsequentially.
Subsequently, I make use of the rich information associated with each camera. This
include (1) speed limits, (2) road type and (3) whether camera is installed in rural or urban
areas (See Table 6 for more details). To do so, ﬁrst, I match each each site i with another
site j based on the following rules:
19This is because often there are very little reported deaths on roads, which is why the small
estimate could generate signiﬁcant changes.
20It will not be advisable to control for traﬃc as it is likely to be a "bad" control. The implementa-
tion of speed camera is likely to reduce traﬃc ﬂow by displacing them to neighbouring unmonitored
roads. Moreover, detailed road level traﬃc ﬂow data is only available for a small sub-sample of
roads.
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Table 2: The Eﬀects of Speed Camera on various accident outcomes within 500 metres from
Camera using Poisson Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Baseline Demo VMT Weather Non-CAM -3,+3
Accidents -0.469a -0.488a -0.268a -0.243a -0.184a -0.095a -0.222a
(0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017)
Obs 66868 25720 25720 25720 7383 35929 9841
Absolute -2.11 -2.36 -1.44 -1.32 -0.89 -0.82 -1.13
% ∆ -37.43 -38.65 -23.54 -21.55 -16.78 -9.09 -19.88
No.of CAM 2481 1555 1555 1555 659 2249 1481
Slight -0.412a -0.483a -0.278a -0.253a -0.185a -0.057a -0.207a
(0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021)
Obs 57224 21355 21355 21355 5483 31564 8175
Absolute -2.25 -2.87 -1.82 -1.67 -1.19 -0.64 -1.33
% ∆ -33.74 -38.29 -24.30 -22.34 -16.87 -5.56 -18.70
No.of CAM 2123 1294 1294 1294 518 1988 1223
Serious -0.788a -0.747a -0.454a -0.414a -0.326a -0.326a -0.373a
(0.015) (0.022) (0.033) (0.034) (0.074) (0.028) (0.042)
Obs 63280 23650 23650 23650 6539 33823 8306
Absolute -0.58 -0.57 -0.39 -0.37 -0.25 -0.35 -0.33
% ∆ -54.55 -52.63 -36.49 -33.93 -27.81 -27.84 -31.15
No.of CAM 2346 1428 1428 1428 572 2115 1240
Deaths -0.956a -1.071a -1.029a -1.018a -1.124a -0.761a -0.858a
(0.041) (0.073) (0.116) (0.119) (0.209) (0.093) (0.153)
Obs 42924 11394 11394 11394 2787 18765 2843
Absolute -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 -0.19
% ∆ -61.57 -65.75 -64.28 -63.85 -67.51 -53.27 -57.59
No.of CAM 1591 683 683 683 220 1155 426
CAM FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Demographics 3 3 3 3 3
VMT 3 3 3 3
Weather 3
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γ from a diﬀerent Poisson regression esti-
mated using Maximum likelihood. Dependent variable is the annual Y count where
Y=accident, injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left and right of camera hous-
ing. Absolute is the number of reductions in accident outcomes computed by multi-
plying the % ∆ with the pre-treatment mean of Y . % ∆ is the proportional change
(semi-elasticity) of collision outcomes after treatment and is computed by taking
exp(γ)− 1. In Column (1), I include the entire sample of cameras. In Column (2), I
conduct the analysis for a sample of sites that I have full set of co-variates. In Col-
umn (3), I include a vector of controls that captures the variation in demographics
and labour outcomes that include population size, % of 18 to 25, Gross Annual Pay
& hours worked. In Column (4), I control for the annual average vehicle miles trav-
elled. In Column (5), weather controls are added into the speciﬁcation. In Column
(6), I include a sample of non-camera sites that are eligible for camera installations
into the estimation. In Column (7), I constraint the analysis to observations just
3 years before and after from the year of installation. Sandwich (robust) standard
errors are reported in the parentheses. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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1. Within 20 kilometres from one another
2. Same rural-urban classiﬁcation
3. On the same road type (A,B,C,Minor or Motorways)
4. Same speed limits
5. Within 5 years from one another in installation dates
6. Within 70% - 130% in accident outcomes
The objective is to ensure that each camera is benchmarked with the most similar yet-
to-be treated site. In short, I am comparing changes in collision outcomes for camera i with
camera j based on these rules. I managed to pair up to 1229 sites. Instead of exploiting
within camera variation, now the speciﬁcation includes pair-match-camera ﬁxed eﬀects (or
pair interacted with camera ﬁxed eﬀects). Alleviating these diﬀerences between sites again
do not matter much as enforcement eﬀects remain signiﬁcant for all collision outcomes.
Overall, my results conﬁrm that enforcement cameras have an immediate impact on
road safety within the vicinity of the housing. However, it is unsure that how this eﬀect
could change across diﬀerent road/camera characteristics, space and over time. This will be
examined in the following sections.
6.2.3 Eﬀects across Road Types, Speed Limits & Time
Next, I allow the eﬀectiveness of speed cameras to vary across diﬀerent road and camera
characteristics and over time with the following speciﬁcations:
E(Yijt) = exp(αi + γw(Tit ∗H′w) +X ′jtφ+ θt + εijt), (3)
where the H′w represents a vector of binary variables that equals to unity denoting each:
1. Speed limit (30,40,50,60 & 70)
2. Road Class (Motorway, A, B & Minor)
3. Year after treatment (1,2...10 years after installation)
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Table 3: Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Major Roads No 2006-2016 Matched Pair FE
NB Poisson NB Poisson NB Poisson
Accidents -0.209a -0.237a -0.243a -0.264a -0.431a -0.401a
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.022)
Obs 30579 30579 19936 19936 17986 17986
Absolute -1.36 -1.52 -1.55 -1.67 -5.27 -4.97
% ∆ -18.87 -21.09 -21.61 -23.18 -35.03 -33.04
No.of CAM 1855 1855 1208 1208 1229 1229
Slight -0.213a -0.308a -0.261a -0.422a -0.452a -0.476a
(0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027)
Obs 26967 26967 16143 16143 16688 16688
Absolute -1.67 -2.31 -2.00 -2.99 -6.26 -6.53
% ∆ -19.19 -26.54 -22.98 -34.40 -36.35 -37.89
No.of CAM 1639 1639 982 982 1129 1129
Serious -0.340a -0.411a -0.389a -0.485a -0.486a -0.517a
(0.031) (0.028) (0.041) (0.050) (0.054) (0.031)
Obs 28978 28978 18405 18405 16852 16852
Absolute -0.35 -0.40 -0.39 -0.46 -0.96 -1.00
% ∆ -28.85 -33.68 -32.22 -38.42 -38.46 -40.39
No.of CAM 1749 1749 1114 1114 1143 1143
Deaths -0.762a -0.789a -0.822a -0.879a -0.757a -0.468a
(0.103) (0.081) (0.149) (0.128) (0.190) (0.113)
Obs 14791 14791 7988 7988 8589 8589
Absolute -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.20 -0.14
% ∆ -53.32 -54.56 -56.06 -58.47 -53.12 -37.38
No.of CAM 886 886 480 480 557 557
CAM FE 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
LA Controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
CAM FE*Pair-FE 3 3
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γ from a diﬀerent regression. Columns
1,3,5 are estimated using Negative Binomial regressions, while 2,4,6 are esti-
mated using Poisson regressions. Dependent variable is the annual Y count
where Y=accident, injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left and right
of camera housing. In columns (1) & (2), I restrict the analysis to cameras
in A-Roads and Motorway to alleviate the eﬀects of traﬃc displacement on
collisions. In columns (3) & (4), I remove cameras installed from 2006 on-
wards as they could be diﬀerent from the other cameras. In columns (5)
& (6), I match each camera i with another camera j based on location,
pre-treatment accident outcomes and various road characteristics. I exploit
the variation now between two speed cameras by including speed cam inter-
acted with pair-ﬁxed eﬀects. Bootstrapped and sandwich (robust) standard
errors are reported for Negative Binomial and Poisson Regressions respec-
tively. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
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In short, I am allowing enforcement eﬀects to vary across these characteristics. Speciﬁcations
for speed limits and road types are summarized in Panel A and B of Table 4 respectively.
Only the key estimates γw are reported.
From Panel A, although I ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvement in road safety across diﬀerent
speed limits, more pronounced enforcement eﬀects are documented along roads with higher
speed limits. Speciﬁcally, the number of collisions fell by 50 to 57% along 60mph roads
compared to 22 to 25% along 20mph roads. Similar larger decreases are observed for serious
injuries, at around 87-88%, and deaths, at around 94-95%, on 60mph roads. In contrast,
serious injuries fell by 36-41% along 20mph roads and no signiﬁcant reductions in deaths
are reported. There are several explanations to this. First, it could be that drivers along
the lower speed limit roads are already commuting slowly and insigniﬁcant reductions in
speed achieve by cameras do not matter much in reducing the gravity of collisions. Second,
attenuated enforcement eﬀects for more binding speed limits suggest that drivers may be
forced to hastily drop speed so as not to be ﬁned, inducing more collisions in some instances
that could reduce enforcement eﬀects.
Panel B summarizes the results of camera enforcement eﬀects on diﬀerent road types.
Motorways are inter-city major roads for long distance travelling. A-Roads are slightly less
important compared to Motorways but can still be considered trunk roads that provides
large scale transport links. B-Roads are slightly smaller linkage roads for traﬃc between
A-Roads and Minor roads. Minor Roads are smallest roads intended to connect local traﬃc,
linking an estate/village with the larger road links. I do not observe stark diﬀerences in
enforcement eﬀects across the diﬀerent road types. This is except for Motorway where no
signiﬁcant reductions in slight injuries and deaths are reported. This is likely due to a sample
issue as only 1% of the cameras are found along Motorways.
Next, I examine how the eﬀectiveness of speed cameras vary over time. Results are
summarized in Figure 10. This is to understand whether the enforcement eﬀects diminish
over time to justify the decision to switch oﬀ the cameras. Results reveal that cameras
remain eﬀective and in fact become more potent in reducing collisions and fatalities over
time. Weaker eﬀects in the beginning suggest that some drivers could be unfamiliar with the
locations of camera. They could be forced to abruptly drop speed to avoid ﬁnes, inducing
more crashes. Over time, drivers learn about these locations and are less prone to reckless
braking, explaining stronger enforcement eﬀects.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous eﬀects of Speed Camera on various accident outcomes across diﬀerent
roads and speed limits
Panel A: Speed Limit
Accidents Slight Serious Deaths
NB Poisson NB Poisson NB Poisson NB Poisson
Speed Limit 20 -0.281a -0.247a -0.148 -0.130b -0.533b -0.446b -0.621 -0.514
(0.077) (0.066) (0.107) (0.066) (0.210) (0.211) (4.765) (1.007)
-24.46 -21.91 -13.74 -12.23 -41.33 -35.96 -46.28 -40.19
-1.49 -1.34 -1.03 -0.92 -0.45 -0.39 -0.09 -0.07
Speed Limit 30 -0.294a -0.227a -0.352a -0.241a -0.432a -0.356a -0.876a -0.891a
(0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.020) (0.035) (0.035) (0.143) (0.124)
-25.45 -20.31 -29.64 -21.43 -35.05 -29.98 -58.37 -58.98
-1.55 -1.24 -2.22 -1.61 -0.38 -0.32 -0.11 -0.11
Speed Limit 40 -0.454a -0.371a -0.515a -0.358a -0.748a -0.657a -1.225a -1.277a
(0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) (0.073) (0.067) (0.220) (0.238)
-36.46 -30.99 -40.27 -30.10 -52.65 -48.14 -70.63 -72.11
-2.23 -1.89 -3.02 -2.25 -0.57 -0.52 -0.13 -0.13
Speed Limit 50 -0.312a -0.213a -0.410a -0.217a -0.658a -0.538a -1.146a -1.188a
(0.047) (0.057) (0.050) (0.063) (0.158) (0.138) (0.265) (0.285)
-26.79 -19.15 -33.62 -19.49 -48.19 -41.62 -68.22 -69.52
-1.64 -1.17 -2.52 -1.46 -0.52 -0.45 -0.13 -0.13
Speed Limit 60 -0.851a -0.697a -0.931a -0.598a -1.682a -1.645a -2.871 -3.060a
(0.164) (0.162) (0.185) (0.203) (0.294) (0.275) (4.342) (0.755)
-57.31 -50.21 -60.59 -45.01 -81.39 -80.70 -94.33 -95.31
-3.50 -3.07 -4.54 -3.37 -0.88 -0.87 -0.18 -0.18
Speed Limit 70 -0.443a -0.314a -0.480a -0.291c -0.718b -0.709b -1.499a -1.505a
(0.106) (0.115) (0.176) (0.163) (0.321) (0.286) (0.356) (0.307)
-35.81 -26.94 -38.09 -25.21 -51.23 -50.79 -77.67 -77.80
-2.19 -1.64 -2.85 -1.89 -0.55 -0.55 -0.14 -0.14
Obs 24871 24871 20522 20522 22833 22833 11004 11004
No.of CAM 1503 1503 1243 1243 1378 1378 659 659
Panel B: Road Type
A Road -0.251a -0.232a -0.353a -0.243a -0.472a -0.393a -0.977a -0.990a
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.035) (0.106) (0.121)
-22.20 -20.70 -29.77 -21.60 -37.60 -32.49 -62.36 -62.84
-1.36 -1.26 -2.23 -1.62 -0.41 -0.35 -0.12 -0.12
B Road -0.367a -0.325a -0.506a -0.345a -0.633a -0.514a -1.359a -1.289a
(0.038) (0.040) (0.045) (0.053) (0.071) (0.077) (0.267) (0.301)
-30.72 -27.77 -39.70 -29.19 -46.89 -40.20 -74.31 -72.44
-1.88 -1.70 -2.97 -2.19 -0.51 -0.43 -0.14 -0.13
Minor Road -0.357a -0.317a -0.607a -0.340a -0.718a -0.645a -1.425a -1.346a
(0.068) (0.055) (0.084) (0.094) (0.113) (0.096) (0.353) (0.344)
-30.04 -27.20 -45.50 -28.82 -51.24 -47.52 -75.95 -73.98
-1.83 -1.66 -3.41 -2.16 -0.55 -0.51 -0.14 -0.14
Motorway -0.266a -0.262a -0.390 -0.105 -0.544c -0.496c -0.116 -0.135
(0.103) (0.077) (0.246) (0.141) (0.306) (0.283) (4.551) (0.470)
-23.34 -23.05 -32.32 -9.95 -41.96 -39.13 -10.97 -12.62
-1.43 -1.41 -2.42 -0.75 -0.45 -0.42 -0.02 -0.02
Obs 25720 25720 21355 21355 23650 23650 11394 11394
No.of CAM 1555 1555 1294 1294 1428 1428 683 683
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γw from a diﬀerent regression from equation 3 estimated
using maximum likelihood. Dependent variable is the annual Y counts where Y=accident,
injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left and right of camera housing. I allow the ef-
fects to vary across diﬀerent speed limits and road types in Panel A and B respectively. The
speciﬁcation adopted is similar to Column 4 of Table 2. Bootstrapped and sandwich (robust)
standard errors are reported in parentheses for Negative Binomial and Poisson respectively.
c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01.
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6.2.4 Eﬀects over Distance
Figure 8 summarizes the estimates from equation (2) that show the eﬀects of speed en-
forcement cameras moving away from the camera housing using Poisson regressions. Results
from Negative Binomial models are summarized in Figure 11 in Data Appendix. Like before,
results are fairly similar across these two models. Precisely, I am capturing the change in ac-
cident outcomes every 100 metres. Every dot represents the coeﬃcients (γk) for key estimate
Dk−100,k ∗Tit from a diﬀerent regression at k to k−100 bandwidth where k = 0, 100, ....2000.
Tails denote the 95% conﬁdence interval. If the estimate is denoted by dot, it is signiﬁcant
at least at 10% level. The coeﬃcients can be interpreted as number of accident outcomes
per 100 metre.
Unsurprisingly, I ﬁnd localised enforcement eﬀects around the camera and these eﬀects
dissipate quickly across distance. Reductions are largely around 0 to 500 metres around
the camera and strongest eﬀects are reported closest to the camera. This result is fairly
consistent across the diﬀerent accident outcomes and correspond to earlier literature (Li
et al., 2013). Beyond 700 metres from the device, ﬁxed speed cameras are no longer able to
enhance road safety. Moving further away, beyond 1500 metres from the camera, there are
suggestive evidence of kangaroo eﬀects as I report small rebound in the number of collisions,
serious injuries and deaths. A small proportion of drivers could have speed up beyond the
surveillance of cameras, inducing more collisions post implementation. However, these eﬀects
are quite small compared to the enforcement eﬀects from cameras.
6.3 Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
This section reports a cost beneﬁt analysis on speed cameras. The costs include the ﬁxed
and operating costs of camera and the time delays incurred by bypassing drivers, while the
beneﬁts include the savings from less collision, injuries and fatalities. Fines from speeding
tickets are not considered as the government could redistribute these revenues to the society.
While I am not able to recover all these estimates from my analysis, I rely on either previous
literature or reports. The parameters are summarized in Table 5.
For the beneﬁts, I rely on the savings per traﬃc accidents, injuries and deaths computed
by DfT21. These values account for both (1) casualty-related costs (loss output, medical and
21For more information, refer to https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/254720/rrcgb-valuation-methodology.pdf
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ambulance, human costs) and (2) accident-related costs (property damage, insurance and
administrative and police costs). Total savings are computed by multiplying earlier estimates
on reductions with the savings on per capita or accident basis.
For the costs, to compute the time delays from speed camera, I rely on estimates from
Gains et al. (2005). Speed is approximately 10kmh slower after the camera is implemented.
Taking the average speed limit of 58kmh22 (30mph) and a distance of 1km around the
camera, drivers incur a delay of 1.24 minutes whenever they pass a speed camera. Based on
the Annual Average Daily Traﬃc (AADT) ﬂow along roads with speed cameras from DfT,
I assume that there are approximately 18,500 vehicles bypassing each camera every day,
corresponding to around 6.75 million annually. In total, assuming an average occupancy of
1.56 per car, time delays incurred by all bypassing vehicles amount to 217,700 hours every
year.
To compute loss of income from time delays, I assume that 63.3% of the commuters are
between 16 to 64 and are working according to population estimates. As of 2015, employment
rate in U.K is around 74.5%. After excluding holidays and weekends, there are about 261
working days annually and if individuals work around 8 hours every day, and taking median
hourly wage as ¿14.17/hour, the annual net loss in income from delays per camera per annum
amounts to ¿346,749. The cost of installing a ﬁxed speed camera is approximately ¿59,000
and the operating and maintenance cost is around ¿12,441.
The estimated beneﬁts are likely to be smaller from the actual beneﬁts realized as I did
not factor in other non-pecuniary perks. These include environmental beneﬁts from slower
travelling speed that could save more fuel, reduce emissions and improve health outcomes
(van Benthem, 2015). Enforcement cameras could also enhance crime intelligence as images
from these devices could help to solve other crimes (Hooke et al., 1996). Even without
considering these perks, net beneﬁts generated per camera amount to around ¿21,119 per
annum, justifying the implementation of cameras.
22Since most of the speed cameras impose a 30mph speed limit, time delays will be computed
based on the scenario that drivers commute, on average, at a speed limit of 30mph before camera
installation. Drivers are assumed to slow down along a 1km stretch around the camera housing,
500m left and right of the housing. Time delays per driver per trip is therefore approximately equal
to DistancearoundcameraOriginalSpeed−Reductions .
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Table 5: Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis per speed cameras across Great Britain
Parameter Source Value per Unit Net Cost/Beneﬁt/Year
Savings from avoiding Accidents
Damage-only DfT(2015) ¿2,142 1.1×£2, 142 = £2, 356
Slight Injuries DfT(2015) ¿15,450 1.3×£15, 450 = £20, 085
Serious Injuries DfT(2015) ¿200,422 0.3×£200, 422 = £60, 126
Deaths DfT(2015) ¿1,783,556 0.2×£1, 783, 556 = £356, 712
(A)Total Beneﬁts ¿439,279
Time Delays
Speed Reductions Gains(2005) 9.65kmh 1km
(58kmh−9.65kmh) ≈ 1.24mins
Average No. of Cars DfT(2016) 18,500 cars/day 18, 500× 365 = 6, 752, 500
Average Occupancy/car DfT 1.56/car
Total Time Loss (h) 6, 752, 500× 1.24
60
× 1.56 =≈ 217, 700hrs
Employment Rate ONS(2015) 74.5%
% of Pop between 16-64 ONS(2015) 63.3%
No. of working hours per day 8 hours
No. of working days per year 261 days
Median Gross Hourly Earnings ONS(2015) ¿14.17/hour
(B)Loss of Income per cam 8
24
× 74.5%× 63.3%× 217, 700×£14.17× 261
365
= ¿346,749
Cost of Cameras
Fixed Cost Parliament(2008) ¿50,000 £50, 000× 1.18 = £59, 000
Operating Cost Hooke(1996) ¿8,560/year £8, 560× 1.45 = £12, 441
(C)Total Camera Costs per year ¿71,411
(D)Total Costs B+C=¿418,160
Net Costs/Beneﬁts A-D=+¿21,119
Note: All the dollar values are adjusted to 2015 price levels. Estimates on savings from avoiding accidents are
obtained from Column (7) of Table 2. Fixed Costs include planning, signage, installation and procurement, and
other ﬁxed costs. Operating costs include operation, administrative, maintenance, publicity and liaison costs
that recurs annually. These ﬁgures are obtained by averaging across a sample of cameras installed 10 study areas
across UK in ﬁnancial year 1995/96.
7 Conclusion
This paper utilizes micro geo-coded dataset on traﬃc accidents to evaluate the eﬀective-
ness of speed enforcement cameras. These devices deter reckless driving on roads particularly
prone to collisions by imposing ﬁnes when drivers exceed speed limits. In contrast to earlier
literature, I address the selection bias by analyzing only sites that will ever have a speed cam-
era installed. The empirical strategy is a quasi-experimental diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence frame-
work that relies on comparing accident outcomes before and after a speed camera is installed
with other sites that will experience installation in the near future.
Assuming a linear relationship between cameras and collisions, putting another 1,000
speed cameras on roads could reduce approximately 1130 crashes, preventing around 330
serious injuries and in turn, saving 190 lives every year and generating beneﬁts up to ¿21
million. These results remain robust across a range of speciﬁcations that relaxes the identi-
ﬁcation strategies. Dwelling further, however, reveal that these eﬀects are largely localised
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within 0 to 500 metres from the camera and there are suggestive evidence of a rebound in
collisions further away from the camera. This illustrates the possibility of drivers speeding up
beyond the surveillance of cameras and inducing more accidents. Nevertheless, simple cost-
beneﬁt analysis reveals that the perks from installing a camera are marginally larger than
the cost of cameras. But with technology advancement, newer prototypes, such as mobile
and variable speed cameras, should be considered to circumvent the weaknesses associated
with ﬁxed speed cameras and more eﬀectively deter speeding.
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8 Data Appendix
Table 6: List of Variables
Variable Source Description
Dependent Variable (Yijt )
Accident STATS19 Number of Accidents at site i in LA j in
year t
Slight Injuries STATS19 Number of Slight Injuries at site i in LA j
in year t
Serious Injuries STATS19 Number of Serious Injuries at site i in LA
j in year t
Deaths STATS19 Number of Deaths at site i in LA j in year
t
Local Authority Characteristics(X ′jt)
Gross Annual Salary Annual Labour Force
Survey
Average Gross annual salary at LA j
Hours worked Annual Labour Force
Survey
Average number of hours worked in LA j
Job Density Nomis Number of Jobs per unit area of LA j
(hectare)
% of 18 to 25 Nomis Population
Estimates
Percentage of population aged 18 to 25 in
LA j
VMT DfT Annual average vehicles miles travelled in
LA j
Max Temperature MIDAS Annual average max air temperature in LA
j
Min Temperature MIDAS Annual average min air temperature in LA
j
Wind Speed MIDAS Annual average wind speed in LA j
Camera/Road Characteristics
Speed Limit - Binary variable denoting whether speed
camera in site i has a speed limit of l where
l=30,40,50,60 or 70
Road Type - Binary variable denoting whether speed
camera in site i in road type r where
r=Motorway, A, B, C or Minor
Rural ONS Rural Urban
2011 classiﬁcation
Binary variable denoting whether speed
camera in site i is in rural area, otherwise
it is located in urban area
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Table 7: Review of Existing Literature on Speed Camera Evaluation
Authors Dataset Methodology Results
Chen et al. (2002) 12 Photo Radar Pro-
grams (PRP) over
22km along a highway
in British Columbia,
Canada, 2 years pre
post
EB 2.8 km/h (3%) ↓ in speed; 7% ↑ in traﬃc;
overall 16% ↓ in collisions across entire corri-
dor with positive spillover eﬀects at non PRP
locations. Unlike cameras, drivers are unsure
of PRP deployment
Christie et al. (2003) 101 Mobile Speed
cameras in South
Wales, UK, 3 years
pre, 1 year post
BA with circle and
route based measures
50% (1.8) ↓ in injury crashes; eﬀects are
within 300 to 500m and no longer signiﬁ-
cant beyond; eﬀects are stable across time
and similar for 30mph and 60-70mph roads
Cunningham et al.
(2008)
Mobile Speed cameras
in Charlotte, North
Carolina, US, 5 years
BA with compara-
ble reference groups
constructed based on
characteristics
10% ↓ in collisions, decrease in travelling
speed
Elvik (1997) 64 Speed cams in Nor-
way,
EB 20% ↓ in injury crashes; 12% ↓ in property
crashes; eﬀects are largely driven by road sec-
tions with warrants - a certain level of crash
and speed limit for the use of speed limit.
Gains et al. (2004,
2005)
2,300 speed cameras
across 23 areas across
UK, 3 years pre post
BA & EB 6% ↓ in speed; 91% ↓ in excessive speeding
(>15mph); 22% ↓ in collisions; 42% ↓ in ca-
sualties
Goldenbeld & van
Schagen (2005)
28 Rural Roads in
Friesland, Nether-
lands, 5 years pre and
8 years post
BA with other rural
roads as comparables
4 km/h ↓ in speed; overall 21% ↓ in collisions
and casualties
Hess & Polak (2003) 43 ﬁxed speed cams in
Cambridgeshire, Eng-
land, over 11 years
ARIMA, BA with
comparable ref-
erence sites, long
pre-treatment period
to mitigate RTM
18% ↓ in collisions & 32% ↓ in injury crashes
Jones et al. (2008) 29 mobile cams in
Norfolk, England, for
4 years
BA with 48 ﬁxed
speed cam sites as
comparables
18% ↓ in collisions & 35% ↓ in fatal crashes;
no evidence of migration of accidents
Li et al. (2013) 771 ﬁxed speed cam
sites across England, 9
years
DID-PSM, EB; refer-
ence groups by match-
ing on observables
23-31% (0.9-1.4) ↓ in collisions; 0.12 - 0.34
↓ in fatal crashes; eﬀects smaller with PSM
& localised within 200m ; no spillovers of
accidents
Li & Graham (2016) 771 ﬁxed speed cam
sites across England, 9
years
DID-PSM, EB; refer-
ence groups by match-
ing on observables
Cameras are more eﬀective in reducing col-
lisions on riskier sites, measured by higher
historical collision counts.
Keall et al. (2001) Visible and Hidden
cameras in 4 regions in
New Zealand, 1 year
pre and post
BA with matching on
road characteristics
for comparables
0.7 km/h ↓ in speed; overall 11% ↓ in colli-
sions, 19% ↓ casualties; hidden cameras has
a more general eﬀect across road
Mountain et al. (2004) 62 ﬁxed speed cams
across Great Britain,
3 years pre post
EB 35% ↓ in speeding, 26% (1.36) ↓ in collisions,
34% (0.31) ↓ in fatal crashes 500m from cam;
eﬀects ↓ moving away from cam
Mountain et al. (2005) 79 enforcement
schemes (17 mobile,
62 ﬁxed) across Great
Britain, 3 years pre
post
EB 4% ↓ for every 1mph ↓ in speed ;Larger ↓
reported for lower speed roads; Vertical de-
ﬂections (speed humps) more eﬀective in re-
ducing speed and accidents
Newstead & Cameron
(2003)
Speed cameras in
Queensland, Aus-
tralia, over a 5 year
span (2006 to 2007)
Poisson BA with ref-
erence sites more than
6km away
21% ↓ in non-injury crashes, 31% ↓ in injury
crashes, largest eﬀects localised within 2km
Perez et al. (2007) 8 mobile cams in
Barcelona, Spain
BA Poisson regres-
sions with nearby ref-
erence sites
9 mph ↓ in speed; 27% ↓ in collisions and
injuries, greater eﬀects on weekends
Shin et al. (2009) 6 speed cameras in
Scottsdale, Arizona
US, over a 2 year span
(2006 to 2007)
BA, EB with nearby
reference sites
9 mph ↓ in speed; overall 44-55% ↓ in all
collisions, 28-48% ↓ in injury crashes, but
no eﬀect on rear-end crashes; no discernable
spillovers
EB - Empirical Bayes, BA - Before and after analysis, DID - Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence
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(a) Original Gatsometer BV (b) Digital Gatsometer
(c) Original Truvelo (d) Truvelo D-Cam
(e) SpeedCurb
Figure 9: Diﬀerent models of Fixed Speed Cameras across United Kingdom
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Table 8: The Eﬀects of Speed Camera on various accident outcomes within 500 metres from
Camera using Negative Binomial Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Baseline Demo VMT Weather Non-CAM -3,+3
Accidents -0.489a -0.520a -0.280a -0.268a -0.212a -0.169a -0.232a
(0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.032) (0.014) (0.020)
Obs 66868 25720 25720 25720 7383 38291 9841
Absolute -2.18 -2.47 -1.49 -1.43 -1.01 -1.34 -1.18
% ∆ -38.68 -40.52 -24.40 -23.47 -19.07 -15.52 -20.70
No.of CAM 2481 1555 1555 1555 659 2429 1481
Slight -0.433a -0.527a -0.423a -0.379a -0.332a -0.222a -0.310a
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.041) (0.015) (0.020)
Obs 57224 21355 21355 21355 5483 33926 8175
Absolute -2.35 -3.07 -2.59 -2.36 -1.99 -2.19 -1.89
% ∆ -35.16 -40.97 -34.52 -31.52 -28.27 -19.91 -26.67
No.of CAM 2123 1294 1294 1294 518 2168 1223
Serious -0.785a -0.758a -0.533a -0.499a -0.447a -0.401a -0.443a
(0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.059) (0.026) (0.045)
Obs 63280 23650 23650 23650 6539 36160 8306
Absolute -0.58 -0.57 -0.45 -0.42 -0.32 -0.40 -0.38
% ∆ -54.40 -53.15 -41.30 -39.31 -36.07 -33.01 -35.81
No.of CAM 2346 1428 1428 1428 572 2290 1240
Deaths -0.934a -1.006a -1.048a -1.018a -0.950a -0.708a -0.883a
(0.040) (0.065) (0.105) (0.098) (0.200) (0.061) (0.124)
Obs 42924 11394 11394 11394 2787 20357 2843
Absolute -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 -0.19
% ∆ -60.69 -63.41 -64.95 -63.85 -61.32 -50.73 -58.63
No.of CAM 1591 683 683 683 220 1271 426
CAM FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Demographics 3 3 3 3 3
VMT 3 3 3 3
Weather 3
Note: Each reported coeﬃcient is the γ from a diﬀerent Negative Binomial regression
estimated using Maximum likelihood. Dependent variable is the annual Y count
where Y=accident, injuries, serious injuries and deaths 500m left and right of cam-
era housing. Absolute is the number of reductions in accident outcomes computed
by multiplying the % ∆ with the pre-treatment mean of Y . % ∆ is the proportional
change (semi-elasticity) of collision outcomes after treatment and is computed by
taking exp(γ)−1. In Column (1), I include the entire sample of cameras. In Column
(2), I conduct the analysis for a sample of sites that I have full set of co-variates. In
Column (3), I include a vector of controls that captures the variation in demograph-
ics and labour outcomes that include population size, % of 18 to 25, Gross Annual
Pay & hours worked. In Column (4), I control for the annual average vehicle miles
travelled. In Column (5), weather controls are added into the speciﬁcation. In Col-
umn (6), I include a sample of non-camera sites that are eligible for camera instal-
lations into the estimation. In Column (7), I constraint the analysis to observations
just 3 years before and after from the year of installation. Bootstrapped standard
errors are reported in the parentheses. c p<0.10, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
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